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Book Note
PEOPLE'S ASSESSORS IN THE COURTS: A STUDY ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
THE LAW. By KIlm6n Kulcsdr. Budapest, Hungary: Akad6miai

Kiad6, 1982 (Eng. Translation). 140 pages.
Member and current Secretary General of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Klm~n Kulcs~r is a distinguished scholar in the
sociology of law. Spanning many decades, his publications include
The Problem of the Law (1960), The Educational Role of Law in
Socialist Society (1961), Society, Politics, Law (1974) and The
Foundation of the Law (1979). Dr. Kulcsir has a special interest in
how social factors affect the Hungarian legal system. In this volume, he explores the role of People's Assessors in the courts. Inaugurated in post-World War II Communist Hungary in 1949, People's Assessors were to ensure lay participation in decision-making
in the judicial system. He examines the role of lay participation in
the courts, stressing its historical context and development. At the
same time, he emphasizes the fundamental problems and limitations of an organization which increasingly demands expertise and
specialized knowledge. The book is rightly subtitled: A Study on
the Sociology of the Law. Dr. Kulcsdr examines and assesses the
social and organizational conditions of the courts within a sociologist's framework of organizational behavior and decision-making.
Although his data is drawn specifically from the Hungarian model,
his conclusions are general enough to offer some insight into the
role of the lay element in the American courts as well.
The Communist succession to power marked a dramatic change
in the norms, values, and outlooks of Hungarian society: their triumph brought a thorough extirpation of traditional ideals and
practices. Political, economic, and social revolutions were paralleled by a judicial revolution. Although prior to 1945, Hungarian
jurisprudence had been based on traditional tenets of Roman Law
and the Napoleonic Code, this was abruptly abandoned in favor of
the politically expedient legal dogmas of the state-dogmas consistent with the building of a Marxist-oriented Socialist society. The

Vol. 23:857

Duquesne Law Review

judicial system suffered another bane: the decline in the status of
the lawyer, placing him alongside the landowner, capitalist, and
army officer as a figure of the past. This era of increased centralization demanded legal expertise more than ever before; yet, it was
only the politically loyal who were permitted to administer justice
and to lay the foundation for a new legal system.
The first law under the new constitution, which was adopted August 20, 1949 (Act II, 1949), addresses the participation of People's
Assessors in the judicial process. It states that a new legal office
was needed so as to permit the people's "conviction, sober view of
life, and natural sense of justice"1 to prevail at judicial proceedings. Elected for a period of one month, a People's Assessor was
placed on the same legal plane as a professionally qualified judge.
In Kulcsdr's "ideal model," an Assessor's participation in the trial
and judicial council was to "introduce views, opinions, values etc.
to the decision within the framework given by legal regulations.
These may differ from the personal outlooks of the judges, from
the features of the organization, and even from formalized legal
policy expectations." '2 A People's Assessor was to serve as a "corrective factor" (a social control) in the proceedings; at the same
time, he was to inform society about the functioning of the laws
and judicial system.
As Kulcs~r's research shows, the Assessors' observable role diverged significantly from the ideal. Two general historical trends
affected this: the growing nexus between legal systems and political
power, and the continuing decline in the significance of lay participation in judicial decision-making. The political-legal link was especially strong in the immediate postwar years: People's Assessors
were selected so as to give "preference to the interests of the socialist political system and political organizations." 3 Certain decrees narrowed down participation in courts to "the working people," i.e., to those found politically suitable. Nevertheless, in
subsequent years, the position of the People's Assessor became
more moderate and more in line with the normal functioning of the
court system, and it is the behavior of these "moderated" People's
Assessors which Kulcsfr analyzes in this work.
Kulcsir approaches his study of the role of People's Assessors as
a sociologist; he sees the court as an organization, and studies the
1. K. KULCSAR,
37 (1982).
2.

Id. at 128.

3. Id. at 41.
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activities of its members within the framework of organizational
behavior analysis. His methods in the chapter on participation and
decision-making in the court parallel the methods used to assess
business behavior. In fact, one of his most frequently cited sources
is Economics Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon's study on administrative behavior.
Structurally, Kulcsdr's book is divided into four chapters; each is
further subdivided into a certain number of sections. He devotes
the first chapter to historical background and to the explanation of
assumptions and methodology. The second chapter outlines his
empirical findings about the demographic composition and attitudes of People's Assessors, the third traces the extent and effect
of participation and the fourth investigates the possibilities and social limits of lay jurisdiction.
The study reveals some important differences between the ideal
model of the People's Assessor and its actual functioning. Because
no quotas exist for those selected as People's Assessors, the
demographics of the participants is skewed: lay participation is
weighted heavily toward pensioners and away from agricultural
workers. This distorts the range of opinion received from society.
Of equal importance, a pool of "repeat assessors" has developed,
limiting the number and range of those chosen as People's Assessors: a full 38% of those interviewed had served five or more
times." Assessors become unofficial members of the organization
(the court), and as Herbert Simon argues, they are gradually
shaped by the goals, norms, and expectations of the organization-obviating the advantages of extraorganizational participation.5 The problem of organizational assimilation is compounded
by the widespread passivity on the part of the People's Assessors
in the court system; the judge as legal expert, a possessor of specialized knowledge, inhibits lay participation in the proceedings.
The effectiveness and importance of lay participation in the
court system has also been debated in American legal circles. The
studies of the Chicago Jury Project, for example, analyzed the role
and participation of the lay element (the jury) in the American
courts. It concluded that the balance between judge and jury (their
relative importance in the proceedings), was very much dependent
on the judge's personality.' This is in strong agreement with Kulc4.
5.
6.

Id. at 69.
H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 169 (1975).
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 416-42 (1966).
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sdr's assessment to the effect that "a combined evaluation of all
subjective and organizational factors gives a picture in which the
person and activity of the presiding judge is the strongest."' The
specialized or technical elements in the judicial decision constitute
the more significant factor in both systems.
In 1962, the Dean of Harvard Law School expressed his feeling
about the role of the lay element in the American courts as follows:
Even in the best of cases, trial by jury is the apotheosis of amateurs. How
can anyone think that 12 people selected at random in twelve random ways
with the only criterion being a complete lack of general qualification would
have special ability to decide on disputes between people?8

Kulcsir feels that this view is a misunderstanding of the role of lay
participation in the contemporary judicial process. The most important characteristic of any lay element is that it is "organizationalien," its very existence working to prevent the administration of
justice from becoming organizationally routine. Kulcsir suggests
that given more information about the case and its circumstances,
a People's Assessor could countervail the judge's dominating influence. In the end, Kulcs~r emerges as a strong proponent of People's Assessors and the lay element in the courts.
Having just presented observations underscoring the ineffectiveness of People's Assessors and the lay element, this is a quixotic, if
admirable position. Although, in theory, the People's Assessor will
always be "organization-alien," by the arguments and observations
presented in this study the de facto significance of this distinction
is minimal. Professor Kulcsdr is attached to the idea of the lay
element in the courts. But even with his proposed reforms, he gives
us little reason to believe that the People's Assessor can ever gain
an important role in the judicial decision-making process. Instead
of being assured about the viability of lay participation in the contemporary court system, we become even more convinced of its declining significance.
The book is well-researched; its observations and analysis are cogent and well thought out. Kulcsdr is a top scholar in his field and
even a cursory glance at this volume will reveal the thoroughness
of his research. The book's only major (though not intrinsic) flaw is
the quality of translation: it does little to simplify the prolix nature
of contemporary Hungarian. The quality of editing is also poor:
common words such as "judgment" are consistently misspelled.
7.

KULCSAR, supra note 1, at 109.

8.

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S REPORT 5-6 (1962-63).
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The book has an appendix which includes regulations implemented
in 1975 (after Kulcsdr had collected the data for his study). These
new regulations restrict participation of People's Assessors to only
the most important cases.
Nicholas A. Vardy
Stanford University

